Propaganda kills: how the Kremlin's lies turned Russian air defense into a threat to its own population

‍Over the past five years, the Russian authorities have built one of the most successful informational constructs inside the country. Muscovites and residents of other large cities were systematically told that Russia had created the best air defense system in the world, capable of intercepting virtually any threat. Television, military bloggers, and official representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense have repeated the same thesis for years: Russian air defense sees everything, shoots down everything, and guarantees absolute security.

On June 18, this legend collided with reality.

The successful strike on the Moscow Refinery in Kapotnya escalated from just another attack on Russian infrastructure into a demonstration of how dangerous internal propaganda can be for a state that begins to believe its own fabrications.

The damaged plant is located just a few kilometers from the center of the Russian capital. The enterprise provides about 40 percent of Moscow's gasoline needs, half of its diesel fuel needs, and is one of the key suppliers of aviation fuel for the Moscow aviation hub. In fact, it involves one of the most important logistical facilities of the entire Russian Federation.

Just a few years ago, the mere fact of a successful strike on such a facility would have seemed impossible even to many Western analysts, because the capital region was traditionally considered the most protected airspace in Russia. A multi-layered defense system was created around Moscow, which included S-300, S-400, and Pantsir-S1 complexes, electronic warfare systems, and an extensive radar field.

That is why the outcome of the attack matters not only because of the damage inflicted: it demonstrates that even the most protected region of Russia can no longer be considered untouchable.

It is particularly telling that the attack was not random. A few days prior, Ukrainian forces conducted a massive raid during which a significant number of drones reached the Moscow region. At first glance, that strike did not yield an immediate effect. However, it was this exact strike that made it possible to uncover the operational configuration of the Russian air defense, identify vulnerable areas, and simultaneously forced the occupiers to expend a significant portion of their interceptor stockpiles.

The subsequent attack then utilized the obtained results. In fact, we are observing a classic reconnaissance in force that escalated into the depletion of the enemy's air defenses.

But even more interesting are the consequences for Russia itself, as the Kremlin has found itself trapped by its own propaganda.

For years, the authorities convinced citizens that an aerial threat to Moscow was impossible. The population was fed the image of a fortress city, protected by a multi-layered "dome" through which no missile or drone could break.

That is exactly why today the Russian authorities cannot afford to tell the truth: admitting the real scale of the threat means destroying one of the fundamental myths of the Putin system.

Instead, the authorities are forced to maintain the illusion of complete control even when this illusion begins to directly threaten the lives of their own citizens; the most striking example was the operation of the Russian air defense during the recent attacks.

Over recent months, videos of Russian anti-aircraft missiles falling in residential neighborhoods have regularly appeared online. A number of high-rise buildings in the Moscow region sustained damage precisely as a result of failed interceptions or falling debris from Russian missiles. However, official statistics on such incidents are virtually non-existent.

The reason is simple — Russian propaganda cannot allow a situation where citizens begin to ask an uncomfortable question: what poses a greater danger to Moscow's residential areas — Ukrainian drones or Russian air defense?

As a result, the Russian command increasingly deploys air defense systems directly inside densely populated areas. Launchers appear on the roofs of buildings, near residential neighborhoods, and close to civilian infrastructure facilities.

From a military point of view, such a decision is understandable, but from a political point of view, it is mortally dangerous. In fact, the Kremlin deliberately shifts the risks of war onto its own population in an attempt to protect strategic facilities.

The situation around the Sadovod market became illustrative. While Russian officials reported the successful interception of aerial targets, the consequences of the operation of Russian air defense and electronic warfare systems led to a fire at one of Moscow's largest marketplaces.

Paradoxically, in the conditions of modern warfare, Russian air defense increasingly demonstrates the ability to hit its own country's civilian infrastructure more effectively than Ukrainian drones do.

This is exactly where the main effect of propaganda manifests itself: it begins to kill. Not because people believe in lies, but because the state begins to make decisions based on these lies.

For years, Russia created a picture of Moscow's absolute protection. As a result, the population is unprepared for real risks, lacks a culture of responding to aerial threats, and receives contradictory signals from the authorities.

Against the backdrop of official statements about total control, residents of certain areas of the capital complain about toxic smoke from the burning refinery, while local authorities are forced to conduct unpublicized evacuation measures.

The situation is worsened by the systemic crisis of Russian air defense. Throughout the entire war, Russia actively used S-300 complex missiles for unintended purposes. Instead of intercepting aerial targets, they were massively used for strikes on Ukrainian cities as surface-to-surface missiles. Such a decision provided a short-term effect of terror but had long-term consequences.

Today, Russia faces a shortage of the exact missiles that were supposed to protect its own sky.

The problem cannot be quickly resolved even through domestic production. Sanctions significantly restrict access to critical components, and the production rates of new systems do not compensate for the rate of ammunition expenditure. At the same time, Ukraine continues its systematic hunting of Russian air defense assets in the occupied territories.

Every destroyed complex in Crimea or the Luhansk region means even fewer capabilities to protect the Russian rear.

As a result, the Kremlin finds itself in a classic strategic zugzwang: any of its decisions worsens the situation.

If Moscow decides to further strengthen the capital's defense, the complexes will have to be redeployed from other regions. This will make airfields, military depots, military-industrial complex enterprises, and transport hubs throughout Russia more vulnerable. If the resources remain in place, the risk of new successful strikes on Moscow itself will increase.

That is why the attack on the Moscow Refinery has a significance that goes far beyond a single enterprise — it highlights the main problem of the Russian system.

And what about the Russians?

No less indicative than the strike itself is the reaction of the Russian military blogosphere.

Unlike the first attacks on Moscow in 2023, today there is practically no complete denial of the very fact of a successful breakthrough to the capital among leading milbloggers. The strike on the Moscow Refinery in Kapotnya is recognized even by the channels most loyal to the Kremlin. However, recognizing the fact does not mean recognizing the problem.

In fact, the entire Russian blogosphere is currently operating within three key narratives:

• The first is an attempt to present the attack not as a failure of air defense, but as its success. Milblogger Alexander Kots calls the raid "record-breaking," refers to hundreds of supposedly downed drones, and admits that a few drones still reached the Moscow Refinery. However, the main emphasis is placed not on the fact of the strategic facility being hit, but on the glorification of air defense, electronic warfare, mobile groups, and security forces. The logic is simple: if hundreds of drones attacked, then even a successful strike on the refinery is presented as proof of the defense's effectiveness, not its failure.

• The second narrative is much more interesting. Some Russian milbloggers actually recognize the systemic nature of the Ukrainian campaign. The same Kots describes the events of recent days as a sequential multi-stage operation: first a massive raid to identify weak spots, then verification of the obtained results, and only after that the main strike along the already reconnoitered corridor. In other words, the Russian blogosphere is beginning to openly admit what the Kremlin is trying to hide: Ukrainian strikes are no longer chaotic raids. They have turned into an adaptive campaign that studies the Moscow defense system, looks for its vulnerabilities, and repeatedly exploits them.

• The third narrative is the traditional minimization of consequences. Pro-Kremlin resources acknowledge the fact of the strike itself but try to minimize its significance as much as possible. Fires are explained by minor damage, hitting a strategic facility is replaced by phrasing about "disruption of the operation of individual sections," and any reports about the real scale of the consequences get lost behind the numbers of allegedly successfully downed drones.

Particularly indicative is the reaction of channels that cannot hide the obvious. Footage of huge pillars of fire and smoke over Moscow is actively spreading even among Russian military social media groups. However, almost always such videos are accompanied by an attempt at psychological compensation: they say, yes, it's burning, but the system is working; yes, a breakthrough occurred, but the air defense held up; yes, the strike reached its target, but it's only an isolated incident.

In reality, such a reaction demonstrates a much deeper problem.

The Russian blogosphere no longer argues about whether Ukrainian drones can reach Moscow. It only argues about the scale of the damage and the ways to respond. That is exactly why, in parallel with defending the air defense system, calls for escalation are sounding louder and louder. After the strike on Kapotnya, a number of military correspondents and politicians began demanding new massive attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, bridges, railway junctions, and energy facilities. Thus, the strike on Moscow is used as an argument for the further expansion of the terrorist campaign against the civilian population of Ukraine.

However, the most interesting part lies not even in this.

Today, a significant part of Russians reacts to the events around Moscow with nervous jokes, memes, and irony. This is a typical psychological reaction of a society that faces the destruction of its familiar worldview for the first time. Hysterical laughter allows for the temporary concealment of anxiety.

However, this effect only works as long as the attacks remain episodic. If the strikes on the Moscow region turn into a regular phenomenon, the laughter will very quickly be replaced by questions. And the main one will sound extremely simple: If Russian air defense shoots down absolutely everything, then why is the sky over Moscow burning again?

That is exactly when the Kremlin will face the consequences of its own multi-year propaganda. After all, the most dangerous thing for any regime is not the truth about its weakness, but the moment when its own citizens begin to believe in this weakness.

Oleksandr Kovalenko — military-political analyst

How is the attack on Moscow connected to the situation at the front?

Yes, it can be said that we are now indeed observing serious changes in the combat zone, connected to several factors. The first of them is the exhaustion of Russian troops. Ukraine has managed to wear them down since 2023 to what is probably a peak level, when the Russian army is effectively fighting against Ukraine mainly with its infantry component. In other words, we are now dealing primarily with the enemy’s manpower.

The defensive strategy that Ukraine chose as its basis in 2023 took shape after the Russians went on the offensive in the Avdiivka sector, while the United States, because of the blockage of aid in Congress, effectively delayed support for Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel for half a year. For Ukraine, this caused shell hunger, so we were forced to take a defensive position and shift to a defensive-type strategy. At the same time, the goal of this strategy was not merely to hold the front line, but to slow down and exhaust the enemy as much as possible.

It is precisely now that this campaign has unfolded at a moment when the enemy is maximally exhausted, while Ukraine has gained a technological advantage and dominance over it. This is primarily linked to the use of middle-strike drone technologies and the scaling up of impact on Russian logistics. The enormous mass of Russian occupation forces, which today relies mostly on the infantry component, finds itself in a difficult position when it lacks sufficient and timely logistics.

Strikes against logistics on the battlefield are a key task for us not only in order to force the Russians to stop their offensive, but also so that they lose even the ability to defend effectively. In certain sectors, one can already speak of a crisis in Russian defense, which opens the possibility for Ukraine’s Defense Forces to move into counterattacking actions. For deep-strike and middle-strike operations, drones such as Hornet, RAM-2X, Darts, Bulava and some other modifications are mainly used. For example, Hornets are among the most widespread.

The use of artificial intelligence undoubtedly helps, especially under conditions of Russian electronic warfare and in situations when a drone loses signal for one reason or another. Thanks to artificial intelligence, a drone can at a certain moment function autonomously, independently select targets and carry out the mission even after losing control from the operator. Overall, the use of artificial intelligence has significantly increased the effectiveness of strikes and has become an integral part of Ukraine’s technological success compared with the level at which the Russians currently stand.

Intelligence data from Western special services is also very important. It helps plan not only deep-strike attacks, but also certain middle-strike operations. This makes it possible to verify information about a particular facility: whether it is truly functioning for the purpose known about it; whether it is, for example, a school for training drone operators, a production site or a storage facility. If we are talking about a warehouse, it is important to understand what exactly is stored there: provisions, ammunition, fuel and lubricants, or other resources.

Ukraine does not attack Russian cities as such. Strikes are carried out against production facilities and targets located there. In one city this may be an oil refinery, in another it may be ammunition or equipment production, a research institute, an oil depot, an oil storage facility, a logistics hub or a warehouse. Our goal is not simply to strike cities, but to precisely and deliberately destroy specific elements of Russia’s industrial and military infrastructure.

The priority is the complete destruction of the oil refining sector of the Russian Federation. Another important direction is the destruction of Russia’s military-industrial complex. At the same time, many enterprises that formally may not be part of the defense industry in fact support it with their products, for example with chemical components. Therefore, a strike against a chemical enterprise that allegedly has no direct relation to the military sphere may be entirely justified if its reagents or elements are used in missile fuel, in the production of explosives for missile warheads, shells and other products. Thus, Ukraine’s strategy consists of the consistent destruction of certain categories of Russian industry: oil refining, military-industrial, chemical, as well as influencing Russia’s scientific component, in particular research institutes where new types of weapons and technologies for the war are being developed.

It cannot be said that some single key figure stands behind this campaign. These are collective actions. This includes the actions of Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, Kyrylo Budanov, representatives of the Office of the President of Ukraine, and Robert Brovdi “Madyar”, commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces. It also includes the actions of the leadership of the General Staff, the special services and representatives of all Ukrainian security and defense structures. In other words, this is the collective work of many people on shaping the right strategy for exhausting Russia not only on the battlefield, but also in the rear zone. And we see that this strategy is working.

For Russia, losses in its air defense system are not merely serious, but catastrophic. Since late 2025 and early 2026, Ukraine’s Defense Forces have effectively moved into the format of hunting Russian air defense systems both in the temporarily occupied territories and on the territory of the Russian Federation. Ukraine is conducting a targeted campaign to destroy Russian air defense assets and has already reached the level of destroying several dozen air defense systems every month — roughly 30 to 40 units. At the same time, Russia can produce only a handful of such systems, meaning that compensation for losses is effectively absent. With every month, Russia is losing more air defense systems than it is capable of restoring.

In the near future, problems with Russian air defense will only grow. In addition to the shortage of the systems themselves to cover the airspace, Russia is already facing problems with ammunition. It is spending surface-to-air guided missiles faster than Ukraine is producing drones. This creates a shortage of ammunition for surface-to-air missile systems. Knowing these weaknesses, Ukraine applies tactical solutions accordingly, increasing the effectiveness of drone use. Russia cannot cope with the crisis it has found itself in and has no quick solution. It has no effective answer to Ukrainian drones, so significant changes from the Russian side should not be expected in the near future.

Because of the fuel crisis, Russia may try to import gasoline by sea, but this will not save it from the logical outcome. Logistics in the temporarily occupied territories will still be complicated, and in some cases the transportation of gasoline will be effectively impossible. Russia is now in a historically critical situation: a country once described by Senator John McCain as a gas station is being forced to import gasoline because it already lacks its own resources. We are essentially turning this “gas station” into an empty canister.

The Russian military blogosphere is reacting to this with panic. It is worth noting that it often looks more adequate in its assessments than official Russian propaganda. Top propagandists such as Solovyov, Simonyan or Skabeyeva continue to produce triumphant reports and pretend that nothing is happening. Instead, representatives of the middle and lower tiers of the Russian military blogosphere are reacting sharply to the situation, acknowledging the crisis and demonstrating panic-driven moods. They are already beginning to generate almost seditious theses for the Russian information space — for example, that the war needs to be ended, otherwise Russia may lose it. Over time, these panic moods will probably only scale up.

Crimea is gradually being isolated, and this is an integral part of the comprehensive actions now being implemented in southern Ukraine. Cutting logistics in the south automatically leads to the isolation of Crimea, since it is through the south that the main M-14 highway runs — the key land logistics artery in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. Cutting it means that Crimea turns into a logistics hub for supplying material and technical support to Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. This creates an additional burden for the Russians and makes their logistics significantly more vulnerable.

In certain sectors of the front, the situation is moving into a phase of heavy urban fighting. That is why there are serious grounds to expect that the Russians will try to compensate for their failures in the combat zone with a large-scale information campaign around Kostiantynivka. At the same time, the possible loss of Kostiantynivka would not be critical for the defense of Donetsk region in the sense in which it could have been critical in 2023 or even in 2024. Today, Kostiantynivka is no longer a city of operational-tactical significance in its previous meaning, but rather serves as a delaying element that exhausts the enemy.

The Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration performs the same role. Behind Kostiantynivka, there remain other defense lines, positions and cities, including Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka and Druzhkivka. As in the case of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration, the Russians may exhaust themselves so much in the battles for Kostiantynivka that afterward it will be extremely difficult for them to open new directions and continue advancing. Therefore, the loss of Kostiantynivka would not mean a catastrophe for the defense of Donetsk region. It would undoubtedly be an unpleasant moment, but not a catastrophic one. At the tactical level, this can be described as a situationally expected development.

At this stage, I see a scenario for Ukraine in which a window of opportunity may open at the end of summer or the beginning of autumn. It will need to be used under conditions of a logistical lockdown of the enemy and the further exhaustion of Russian occupation forces. In addition, Russia is now waiting for elections, and this will also be an important factor, since the Kremlin will be forced to deal more with domestic political issues and pay less attention directly to the combat zone.

Informationally, the topic of the war against Ukraine may for some time become more restricted for Russian domestic consumption. Ukraine can use precisely this to realize its window of opportunity, since a general mobilization in Russia is expected afterward. General mobilization, in turn, is a negative factor that may begin to slow down Ukraine’s opportunities already in 2027.

I do not see realistic prospects for the war ending in 2026. Instead, I see the continuation of hostilities and their transfer into 2027. At the same time, precisely because of the exhaustion of Russian troops and the postponement of general mobilization in Russia, a window of opportunity may open for Ukraine during the end of Russia’s summer offensive campaign — approximately in the second half of summer or at the beginning of autumn. This period can be used to significantly improve Ukrainian positions in the combat zone.

This does not necessarily mean a large-scale counteroffensive in the classical sense. I am speaking at least about building up systematic counterattacking actions along the line of contact and in the temporarily occupied territories, improving positions, expanding zones of control and liberating certain territories. This could significantly strengthen Ukraine’s position ahead of possible general mobilization in Russia.

If we speak about the optimistic scenario, I consider the liberation of significant Ukrainian territories to be entirely possible. In particular, Ukraine may get a chance to liberate Kherson region, influence the situation in Zaporizhzhia region, and also scale up the isolation of Crimea. This looks sufficiently realistic provided that Ukraine is able to fully use this window of opportunity.

The negative scenario is that Ukraine will not be able to use this moment and will be forced to carry its defensive strategy into 2027, already taking into account the fact that Russia, through general mobilization, may receive at least 300,000 to 500,000 new mobilized personnel. Within roughly half a year, Russia is capable of mobilizing up to half a million personnel, and possibly even faster. That is why using this window of opportunity at the end of summer or the beginning of autumn is fundamentally important for Ukraine.

Yevhen Pronin — international law attorney

Are we witnessing a turning point?

This may sound overly positive, but in my opinion, yes — this is a turning point, and it is definitely possible to speak of a new stage of the war. Ukraine is systematically moving hostilities into Russia’s deep rear, demonstrating that there are no longer any safe territories. This is an element of a long-term strategy of exhausting Russia’s military potential. There is a colossal range of long-range UAVs, not to mention their quantity. We are waiting for Ukrainian ballistic capabilities in 2027.

What types of weapons are key for these attacks? Medium-range drones? What role does artificial intelligence play?

Today, the main role is played by long-range drones of various types. They are significantly cheaper than missiles, can be produced on a mass scale, and can be constantly improved.

Artificial intelligence is also gradually changing the rules of the game. First of all, this concerns navigation, target recognition, bypassing electronic warfare systems and flight autonomy. This does not mean that the machine makes the decision, but the technologies significantly increase the effectiveness of such operations. In addition, today we saw the terrible performance of Russian air defense, which was simply hitting drones that then fell on civilian infrastructure facilities that were not targets of the Ukrainian side.

Are these changes connected to the new defense minister, Budanov or Madyar? Who are the key figures in the current campaign?

Operations of this kind cannot be prepared in a few weeks. They are the result of work by a large number of structures, which lasted for months and sometimes years.

That is why I would not personalize these successes. This is the work of military intelligence, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Unmanned Systems Forces, the Defense Forces, weapons manufacturers, engineers and the command. These individual leaders certainly set the pace and define priorities, but such campaigns are always the result of the work of the entire system.

What reaction can be expected from the Russian army?

Russia will most likely try to respond by escalating strikes on Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. At the same time, it will be forced to divert more resources to protecting its own territory, strengthening air defense, and guarding military facilities and logistics.

In other words, every Ukrainian strike forces Russia to spend additional forces not on the offensive, but on defending its own rear.

How should Russian strikes on Ukraine and Ukrainian strikes on Russia be assessed from the point of view of international law?

International law draws a very clear line here.

Russia is the aggressor state that launched an illegal war against Ukraine. Ukraine, in turn, is exercising its inherent right to self-defense, enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations.

The mere fact of carrying out a strike on the territory of the aggressor state is not a violation of international law. Legality is determined by something else: whether the target is military, and whether the principles of necessity, proportionality and distinction between military and civilian objects are observed.

That is why strikes on airfields, military factories, ammunition depots or oil depots that support Russia’s war machine may comply with the norms of international humanitarian law. By contrast, deliberate strikes on residential buildings, hospitals or other civilian objects are war crimes regardless of who commits them.