“He Would Make a Deal with the Devil”

Adam Sybera on Andrej Babiš, Czech Populism and the Politics of Self-Preservation

Andrej Babiš has recently taken a firmer public position on Russia and NATO, despite governing alongside parties whose rhetoric has often been sympathetic to Moscow or aligned with Donald Trump's political movement. Is this a genuine change in Czech foreign policy, or another example of Babiš's political pragmatism?

In a new interview with the Institute for European Security Studies (IESS), Adam Sybera examines the political calculations behind Babiš's rhetoric, the electoral weaknesses of his governing coalition, the influence of Václav Klaus on Foreign Minister Petr Macinka, and the limits of openly pro-Russian politics in Czech society.

For Sybera, understanding Czech foreign policy under Babiš requires looking beyond official statements and ideological labels. His central argument is that the prime minister's political survival and economic interests ultimately shape his decisions more than any consistent geopolitical worldview.

“Babiš's primary political interest is Babiš himself”

Andrej Babiš recently suggested that Czechia would fulfil its NATO commitments if Russia attacked the Baltic states, even if the United States were reluctant to become involved. His previous rhetoric seemed quite different. Why do you think his position has changed?

To understand Andrej Babiš, you have to understand what motivates him politically.

His primary political objective is to remain in power for as long as possible. I believe that, once his time as prime minister ends, he may even attempt to become president. From his perspective, that could offer another form of political protection.

There are two things that matter to him more than almost any geopolitical development: his wealth and his personal freedom.

That is where any serious analysis of Babiš has to begin.

A substantial part of his economic interests is rooted in Europe. His agricultural business empire has benefited enormously from the Czech and broader Central European markets, including European Union subsidies.

That creates a fundamental contradiction in his political positioning. He can campaign against Brussels, criticise European institutions and adopt the rhetoric of national populism. But his economic interests are deeply connected to the European system.

He cannot simply ignore that reality.

And Babiš is not stupid. He may be arrogant, and I consider him remarkably ignorant on many issues, but he is not an unintelligent man.

He built an enormous business empire in the post-communist economic environment, including sectors where organised crime and political influence were deeply intertwined during the 1990s. He emerged from that environment as one of the country's most powerful businessmen.

Whatever one thinks of him, that requires a particular set of skills.

He understands power, he understands money, and he understands how to calculate political risks.

I think that is much more important for understanding his decisions than trying to identify some coherent foreign-policy ideology.

“The Czech government failed to win a single Senate seat”

How do the recent Senate election results fit into that calculation?

The results are extremely important because they exposed the vulnerability of Babiš's governing coalition.

ANO governs with Motorists for Themselves and Freedom and Direct Democracy, or SPD. Yet in the latest Senate elections, the governing parties failed to win a single seat.

That is a remarkable political defeat.

Turnout in the second round was only about 21%, which is low in absolute terms, although relatively high by the standards of recent Czech Senate elections.

But the central issue is that the governing coalition came away empty-handed.

Babiš understands the psychological significance of that result.

Voters do not like losers. I think that is true not only in Czechia but in politics more generally. Once a politician begins to look vulnerable, once people start believing that his political momentum has disappeared, maintaining support becomes much more difficult.

Viktor Orbán's political experience offers an interesting comparison in that respect.

Babiš and his advisers know how important the perception of political strength is.

Until recently, he could present himself as the dominant figure in Czech politics, a politician who could decide whom he wanted in government and dictate the terms of political debate.

Now he has to confront the fact that his coalition suffered a major electoral defeat.

Of course, these were Senate elections, not parliamentary elections. They do not automatically determine the government's future.

But they are a warning.

And I think Babiš understands warnings like this very well.

He has an experienced political marketing operation around him. His rhetoric is constantly adjusted according to what his advisers believe voters want to hear.

He is not somebody who develops a position and then remains committed to it regardless of the political consequences.

If his team concludes that a particular message is damaging his popularity, he can change it.

“His money is in Europe, and he knows it”

Does that also explain why Babiš can sound close to Donald Trump one moment and more committed to European security the next?

I think so.

Babiš watches what is happening internationally. He sees the tensions between the United States and Europe, and he understands that the political direction of the Trump administration creates uncertainties for European governments.

At one point, he may have calculated that Trump would effectively abandon Volodymyr Zelenskyy and that a broader conservative political realignment in Europe would follow.

But international politics does not necessarily develop according to those expectations.

European leaders continue to engage with Zelenskyy. European security cooperation continues. And the economic system in which Babiš's interests are embedded remains fundamentally European.

He can see all of that.

He speaks foreign languages, he participates in international political discussions, and he understands what other European politicians are saying.

He can make these calculations.

His money is in Europe. His economic interests depend on Europe.

And he understands that the political structures he relies on are not necessarily permanent.

I do not believe Babiš is a deeply ideological politician.

He is a national populist, certainly. But above all, he is an opportunist.

His political formation began long before he entered democratic politics. He worked in foreign trade under the communist regime, and I think that environment helped shape his understanding of power, personal advancement and political loyalty.

Look at the transformation of his career. He operated within the communist system and later became one of the wealthiest businessmen in post-communist Czechia.

That is hardly the trajectory of someone whose decisions are governed by ideological consistency.

His real ideology is money.

And his primary political interests remain his wealth, his freedom and his ability to stay in power.

He would make a deal with the devil if he believed it would benefit him.

But the moment that arrangement stopped being useful, he would have no particular reason to remain loyal to it.

That is why I would be very careful about interpreting every change in his rhetoric as a genuine change of conviction.

“To understand Macinka, you first have to understand Václav Klaus”

Babiš and Foreign Minister Petr Macinka have also spoken more directly about Russian hybrid attacks against Europe. How do you interpret Macinka's position?

Macinka is a somewhat different case.

To understand Petr Macinka, you first have to understand former Czech president Václav Klaus.

Macinka's entire political career has been closely connected to Klaus. He worked in the presidential office and later spent many years at the Václav Klaus Institute.

For much of his professional life, he operated within Klaus's political environment.

I sometimes describe him, rather harshly, as Klaus's political butler.

For years, his role was to serve a political figure who had already established his position in Czech public life. Then, suddenly, Macinka himself became foreign minister.

Now he sits at international conferences, meets senior political figures and participates in discussions with people such as Hillary Clinton and Radosław Sikorski.

That is an extraordinary transformation.

Klaus has also been an important political influence behind Motorists for Themselves, the party Macinka leads.

And that influence matters.

Macinka belongs to a political current that is strongly populist, sceptical of European integration and attracted to elements of the American MAGA movement.

There are people within his party whose political worldview is very close to MAGA.

We saw this international positioning quite clearly at the Munich Security Conference, where Macinka confronted Hillary Clinton and Radosław Sikorski on questions involving conservative values, Europe and identity politics.

To me, that confrontation reflected an attempt to appeal to a particular transatlantic conservative audience.

It was also an opportunity to demonstrate political relevance in front of figures associated with Trump's movement.

But Macinka's political position is ultimately constrained by something much more basic: he leads a small coalition party.

He can have his own ideological preferences, his own political ambitions and his own international contacts.

Yet his ability to translate those preferences into government policy depends on remaining in the governing coalition.

And that means depending on Andrej Babiš.

“The smaller parties need Babiš more than Babiš needs their ideology”

What role does SPD play in this coalition?

SPD is much more openly pro-Russian in its political positioning.

So you have two smaller parties with somewhat different political identities.

Motorists for Themselves are closer to the MAGA-style populist movement, while SPD has adopted much more explicitly pro-Russian positions.

But both face the same fundamental problem.

To implement their political agendas, they need to remain in government.

And because they are smaller parties, they depend on Babiš.

That gives Babiš considerable leverage over them.

At the same time, he needs their parliamentary support to govern.

So the relationship works in both directions. They depend on each other, even if their political interests are not identical.

This is one of the central contradictions of the current Czech government.

Babiš needs these parties to maintain his parliamentary majority. But their rhetoric and political behaviour can also damage his broader electoral appeal.

Politicians such as Tomio Okamura and Petr Macinka are extremely outspoken. They attract attention with provocative statements about Russia, the European Union, Donald Trump and the future of Western politics.

On social media, these statements can become much more visible than Babiš's own programme.

And that creates a problem for him.

He may have assumed that many of his voters, particularly outside major cities, were not especially interested in foreign policy.

Perhaps he believed he could say almost anything about Russia, Trump or Brussels without suffering significant political consequences.

But the electoral picture suggests that things may be more complicated.

I think Babiš is beginning to understand that some of the people he brought into government are also becoming a political liability.

He needs them to govern, but they can simultaneously pull his popularity down.

That is why he has an incentive to moderate his language when necessary.

“Most Czechs do not want anything to do with Russia”

Does this mean there is a limit to how far openly pro-Russian politics can go in Czechia?

Absolutely. And this is something we discussed in our previous interview.

I would estimate that the genuinely, openly pro-Russian segment of Czech society is relatively small — perhaps around 10%.

That is my estimate, not an exact electoral measurement.

There are many more people who are dissatisfied with previous Czech governments, including governments that were strongly supportive of Ukraine.

But that does not necessarily mean they oppose Ukraine.

People may dislike a government because of its domestic policies, economic decisions or social priorities.

The previous government was strongly pro-Ukrainian, but it was also criticised for policies that many voters experienced as socially insensitive.

Household debt, economic insecurity and the cost of living are serious concerns in Czech society.

When people vote against a government under those circumstances, it is a mistake to interpret every such vote as a rejection of Ukraine or an expression of sympathy for Russia.

Those are different things.

I believe the overwhelming majority of Czech society does not want to be politically aligned with Russia.

And that matters enormously.

Babiš may be able to form a government with politicians whose rhetoric is sympathetic to Moscow. But that does not mean Czech society as a whole shares those views.

There is a difference between dissatisfaction with liberal parties, support for populist alternatives and genuine pro-Russian sentiment.

These categories should not be confused.

“The coalition that keeps Babiš in power may also be pulling him down”

So what does all of this tell us about the direction of Czech foreign policy?

I think the most important thing is to understand the contradiction at the centre of the governing coalition.

Babiš formed this government because it served his immediate political interests.

He needed the parliamentary numbers, and Motorists for Themselves and SPD provided them.

But the same coalition can create longer-term political problems.

Its smaller partners have their own agendas, their own rhetoric and their own political constituencies.

Their positions can become highly visible, especially when they make provocative statements about Russia, Europe or American politics.

And Babiš then has to decide whether continuing to accommodate them is worth the political cost.

That is where his pragmatism becomes important.

He does not need to become a committed European federalist or a principled Atlanticist to change his language.

He only needs to conclude that a more confrontational position toward Russia, or a stronger public commitment to NATO, is more advantageous for his political survival.

The broader European context matters here as well.

National populism has become a major political force across Europe. We see it in different forms in Britain, Germany, Hungary and elsewhere.

The rise of parties such as Alternative for Germany illustrates how deeply this political current has entered European political competition.

Mainstream and populist politicians alike are increasingly forced to decide whether they will cooperate with these movements, compete with them or attempt to absorb parts of their agenda.

Babiš has chosen to govern with them.

But that choice comes with consequences.

He is now discovering that the parties which make his government possible may also undermine his popularity.

And because his principal political objective is to remain in power, I expect him to continue adjusting his rhetoric according to that calculation.

I would not interpret every such adjustment as an ideological transformation.

For Babiš, politics is ultimately about power, survival and personal interests.

And I think that is the key to understanding him.