7 Principles of Ukrainian-Polish Historical Reconciliation
The Kyiv-Warsaw axis has de facto become the gravitational center of European security today. Never before in modern history have these two states had such a favorable window of opportunity to create a single, unshakable defensive core of the continent, capable of dictating its own terms for deterring an aggressor.
However, this colossal strategic potential is currently paralyzed by political shortsightedness. Instead of jointly capitalizing on their combined military and logistical weight in the international arena, both capitals have allowed the ghosts of the twentieth century to hijack the agenda of the twenty-first. Rational dialogue is rapidly being replaced by toxic populism, where a complex history has turned into the simplest tool for satisfying domestic electoral appetites, leaving real survival challenges in the background.
Yet, the geographical and security reality leaves no room for political manipulation: Slovakia's resilience, like Poland's, directly depends on the combat capability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, while Ukraine's defense is impossible without the Polish logistical and infrastructural rear. To prevent the destruction of this strategic partnership, Kyiv and Warsaw must elevate the discourse of national memory beyond current electoral interests.
The Institute for European Security Studies proposes 7 fundamental principles.
1. Deconstruction of simplified schemes: examining tragedies in their full historical context
An objective analysis of the events in Volyn and Galicia in the 1930s-40s is impossible outside a broader historical background. The tragedy unfolded under conditions of statelessness, fierce national confrontation, asymmetrical relations, discriminatory practices of the Second Polish Republic against the Ukrainian population, and the destructive influence of two totalitarian occupation regimes — Nazi and Soviet. To tear the events of 1943 out of this continuous chain of causes and consequences is to deliberately distort historical reality.
Applying such a multidimensional approach is in no way intended to justify acts of violence or absolve moral responsibility for crimes committed against civilians. Its primary function is to reject the primitive binary model where there are only "absolute victims" and "absolute executioners." Only a deep understanding of why mass violence became possible in those specific socio-political conditions will allow the societies of both states to learn this lesson, rather than merely exchanging accusations.
2. Sovereignty of facts: depoliticization of search and research work
Archival research, exhumation work, and the establishment of the exact number and names of victims must proceed continuously, transparently, and rely exclusively on agreed-upon scientific methodology. The process of honoring the memory of the dead must be freed from political quotas and bureaucratic hurdles, becoming the routine work of professional institutions on both sides of the border. Historical truth must remain the result of painstaking work by archaeologists and historians.
Conversely, it is absolutely unacceptable for politicians to pre-formulate a public demand for "desired" statistics or historical conclusions, demanding that scientists confirm them. The establishment of truth cannot be an instrument of diplomatic blackmail or an argument in election campaigns. When historical research is subordinated to political expediency, it loses its scientific value and turns into a generator of new conflicts.
3. Unconditional respect for victims and rejection of the competition of martyrologies
True reconciliation requires both states to openly acknowledge the crimes committed by their representatives against the civilian population. Both Ukraine and Poland must condemn acts of terror against civilians and guarantee every victim the right to a name, a dignified burial, and national memory. This is a basic humanitarian principle that is not subject to diplomatic bargaining.
At the same time, such mutual recognition does not mean an artificial equation of the scales, forms, or motives of violence — these parameters must be established and recorded exclusively by evidence-based history. Mutual respect is based not on the symmetry of political verdicts, but on the recognition of the absolute value of human life. Attempts to measure the number of victims or stage a "competition of tragedies" only devalue the memory of the dead and make genuine public dialogue impossible.
4. Separation of war crimes from the right to a national pantheon
Formations such as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) or the Polish Home Army (AK) were key instruments in the struggle to restore statehood under the existential threat of annihilation for both nations. They operated in the extreme conditions of a clash between two totalitarianisms, and the public perception of these structures on opposite sides of the border will always differ. Acknowledging that individual units, commanders, or rank-and-file members of these movements may have committed war crimes against civilians should not lead to the total demonization of entire liberation structures.
Strategic partnership precludes the possibility of dictation in the realm of national identity. Poland has no right to dictate to Ukraine how to shape its pantheon of heroes, just as Ukraine cannot impose its own assessments of Poland's freedom fighters on Warsaw. A mature interstate partnership is possible only between equal subjects who respect each other's sovereign right to their own historical memory, abandoning the paternalistic concept of "older" and "younger" brothers.
5. Institutional immunity and strict counteraction to Russian PSYOPs
Historical traumas have become the most effective and cheapest weapon in the arsenal of Russian special services. As counterintelligence data confirms, Russia has spent decades systematically preparing the ground to divide Ukrainians and Poles, studying sentiments and creating networks of influence. After 2022, these platforms (particularly on TikTok, X, Telegram) were activated at full capacity, continuously attacking the most painful topics: the Volyn tragedy, the history of the UPA, the status of Ukrainian refugees, and economic competition. The algorithm of such operations is largely not based on outright lies: Russian technologists take a real historical or domestic fact, tear it out of context, supplement it with hyperbolized emotional assessments, and scale it up through bot networks.
To break this scenario, it is not enough for governments to merely exchange protocol statements. No matter how constructively state leaders communicate behind closed doors, the broad masses consume poison daily from media resources moderated by the Kremlin. Therefore, Kyiv and Warsaw must introduce a strict legal and informational "filter" against radicalism in bilateral relations. It must be recognized at the state level that marginal groups and "provocateurs in balaclavas" who parasitize on historical speculation and incite hostility are conscious or unconscious agents of Moscow. The ultimate goal of their activity is not the establishment of historical justice, but the destruction of Euro-Atlantic unity and the alteration of Europe's political landscape in the Kremlin's interests. Democracy and freedom of speech must not become tools of self-destruction in the face of Russian PSYOPs.
6. Rejection of the destructive concept of collective guilt
In modern international law and the civilized world, criminal or moral responsibility always has an exclusively personalized dimension. It applies to specific perpetrators, organizers of violence, and those institutions that issued criminal orders. Any attempt to shift the burden of historical guilt onto contemporary generations of Ukrainians and Poles is a legal and moral nonsense.
National memory built on the destructive presumption of the hereditary responsibility of entire peoples only leads to the endless reproduction of hostility. The past cannot be changed, but how we comprehend it directly shapes our future. The main task of professional history is not to pass final moral judgments on neighboring nations, but to establish the facts as accurately as possible and understand the mechanics of catastrophes, ensuring they are not repeated.
7. Awareness of the multifactorial causes of the conflict
The spiral of mass bloodshed in the 1930s-40s did not arise in a vacuum and was not the result of sudden hatred. It was the logical consequence of a catastrophic convergence of many factors. Among them: state assimilation policies and pacifications during the interwar period, the radicalization of nationalist movements in response to repression, and the cynical policies of Nazi Germany and the USSR, which methodically and deliberately pitted Ukrainians and Poles against each other. The detonator was also the complete collapse of legitimate legal institutions and a general atmosphere of mutual fear amidst a world war.
None of these factors alone provides a complete picture or explains the scale of the tragedy. Only their combination reveals the mechanics of the conflict's emergence. It is important to understand a fundamental difference: this multifactorial analysis is necessary to objectively "explain" historical processes, not to "justify" the organizers or perpetrators of crimes. Without a deep understanding of these mechanisms, societies risk sliding back into populist oversimplification.
Conclusion: between historical right and strategic imperative
Ukrainians and Poles are proud European nations with a strong state-building instinct, naturally and fiercely guarding their own visions of the past. Centuries of close coexistence, territorial disputes, armed conflicts, and shared victories guarantee that the historical narratives of Kyiv and Warsaw will never merge into a single compromise version. And this is absolutely normal: differences in historical views are not a reason to demand that a neighbor renounce their national identity or political dignity.
In the face of a long-term Russian threat, both states are obliged to immediately shed the illusion of strategic self-sufficiency. Viewing a neighboring state solely through the prism of transit needs, just like attempting to condition support during an existential war on concessions in the realm of national memory, is destructive and inevitably weakens both nations.
The security space from the Dnipro to the Vistula is indivisible: the defeat of Ukrainian resistance automatically turns Poland's eastern voivodeships into a frontline, while the loss of the Polish infrastructural shoulder critically narrows Kyiv's chances of victory. The true statesmanship of leaders today is measured not by their ability to impose their own vision of the past on a neighbor, but by their ability to build a future in which both nations retain their sovereignty.
The need for a strong Baltic-Black Sea alliance remains vital, but it can no longer be based on paternalism or romantic myths of the past. It must be a cold, calculated, and highly pragmatic union of states. The history of Eastern Europe does not forgive mistakes and always severely punishes those who place historical emotions above a national strategy for survival. Today, both Kyiv and Warsaw have approached this brink too closely to allow Russian special services to take the final, fatal step for them.