Interview with Mesežnikov: Slovakia After Orbán, Fico’s Limits, and the Battle Over the Country’s Western Orientation 

“The Orbán-Fico tandem no longer exists” 

How has Slovakia, including its domestic politics, changed after the change of prime minister in Hungary? Does Slovakia now feel that this change has actually happened? Or does the state still react as if Orbán, or his shadow, still existed in Hungary?

Slovakia’s domestic political development and its foreign policy have their own internal dynamics. That does not mean that events in neighboring countries do not influence Slovakia, but this internal dynamic is absolutely key to understanding developments in the country.

Today, Slovakia has a government of national-populist parties led by a man who, from the very beginning of his political career, has not behaved as an ally of the Western world. Robert Fico is a politician with sympathies toward authoritarian regimes. His internal mindset is closer to Russia. He has always openly presented his sympathies toward Russia, while being critical of Western allies. He has never criticized Russia.

His views on domestic politics, foreign partnerships, and Slovakia’s broader direction are determined by this political profile. This was true under all governments led by Robert Fico, and he is now heading his fourth government.

For Fico, the alliance with Viktor Orbán was absolutely essential. It created a comfortable position for him inside the European Union, especially at a time when Fico himself was facing problems with the EU. He drew heavily from the way Orbán handled his own disputes with Brussels. They supported each other politically.

Now this factor has disappeared. The Orbán-Fico tandem no longer exists.

However, Fico’s political profile remains the same. His approach to domestic politics still complicates Slovakia’s relations with the European Union. But as a realist, he has to take into account that he no longer has the kind of ally in Europe that Viktor Orbán once was.

That is why some of his positions have softened. Without Orbán, he can no longer openly promote an anti-Ukrainian line in the same way. Slovakia is a weaker state than Hungary. Fico has a weaker position in the European Union. His party no longer has the same position in the European Parliament, because it was expelled from the European Socialists. He has practically no strong allies among European statesmen.

So, from this point of view, Orbán’s departure did not help Fico. For Slovakia, however, this is good news. Fico’s policy damages Slovakia’s national interests. I always make a clear distinction between Fico and his government on the one hand, and Slovakia’s national interests as a democratic country, a civic country, and a member of the EU and NATO on the other.

Orbán’s departure has pushed Slovak foreign policy toward greater moderation. But in domestic politics, it has also created specific conditions for the use of the so-called Hungarian ethnic card — or, I would almost say, an anti-Hungarian card.

In recent years, Slovak-Hungarian bilateral relations were relatively stable. That was partly because Fico and Orbán swept certain problems under the carpet. But now Orbán is gone, and Péter Magyar is critical of some of Fico’s steps in Slovakia. This means Fico may no longer feel restrained from using anti-Hungarian rhetoric to appeal to voters.

Until now, good Slovak-Hungarian relations were presented as a major achievement of both Orbán and Fico. Now Orbán is gone, Magyar is critical, and this may create space for Fico to attack Hungary or the Hungarian prime minister in domestic politics.

There is also the Hungarian Alliance, a political party in Slovakia that was once considered a potential ally for Fico after the next elections. But after Orbán lost and Fico’s party introduced certain legislative proposals, including changes connected to the Beneš Decrees, the Hungarian Alliance said it would not cooperate with Fico. In practice, it has moved closer to the opposition side. That also gives Fico more room to use the anti-Hungarian card.

So there are several factors that indicate a certain change. But a fundamental change in Slovakia can only come when Robert Fico is no longer prime minister.

“Babiš is close to Fico personally, but Czechia is not Slovakia”

When Andrej Babiš became prime minister in Czechia, Fico’s rhetoric seemed to change somewhat. Pro-Fico bloggers and media initially presented this as a positive development that would help Slovakia. But then we saw Babiš acting as a stronger politician than Fico, focused mainly on conflict with the Czech president rather than on building an alliance with Fico. So this alliance did not really materialize. How do you see the relationship between Babiš and Fico? 

Robert Fico and Andrej Babiš are personally much closer than Fico and Orbán were. Andrej Babiš is Slovak. Fico and Babiš have known each other and communicated personally for decades. They are people of the same blood group, so to speak.

They are both former communists and have similar views on many issues. But the Czech Republic is not Slovakia. Czech society has a very strong Western orientation.

Babiš is not pro-Russian. I would even say he is not pro-Russian at all. He is critical of Ukraine, or more precisely of the presence of Ukrainians in the Czech Republic, but not because he is pro-Russian. He is a populist. There is an element of social chauvinism in his politics. He says he cares about “his own people” and argues, for example, that benefits for Ukrainians should be adjusted.

But this is not the same type of perception of Russia’s war against Ukraine that is characteristic of Fico.

Babiš and Fico are personally very close. In Bratislava, we know they are real friends. They supported each other even when Babiš was not prime minister. He attended various events in Slovakia connected to Fico and Smer.

But when it comes to choosing between friendship with Fico and Czech national interests, Babiš will not sacrifice Czech national interests. The Czech center-right would not accept that either. Babiš cannot throw away his chance to remain an acceptable European politician. And he still is one.

He is a Trumpist, a businessman, and his business interests are in Europe and in the West — certainly not in Russia.

Robert Fico, by contrast, has interests connected to Russia. A part of the energy lobby that profits from Russian gas and Russian oil has interests there. That is why, in my opinion, Fico pushes for Russian gas, and now Russian oil, to continue flowing where possible. Babiš does not have this type of interest.

So, yes, the Babiš-Fico alliance is not really taking shape, and I do not think it will. Of course, their relationship will have an effect on bilateral Slovak-Czech relations. We have already seen the restoration of intergovernmental consultations between Slovakia and Czechia — joint meetings of the two governments. Petr Fiala’s government cancelled this format, and Babiš restored it.

They may also have similar views on cooperation within the Visegrad Group. But the importance of Visegrad as a political actor inside the EU is often greatly overestimated. Today, from this perspective, it is an insignificant structure.

Visegrad is useful for regional projects, cross-border cooperation, cultural initiatives, environmental protection, and similar areas. But it is not a united political bloc.

When I hear criticism of Visegrad, I often ask: what exactly are you criticizing? You can criticize individual governments or politicians, of course. But Visegrad itself has not played any decisive role.

If the Visegrad countries spoke with one pro-European and pro-Atlantic voice, then it would matter. That was the case before their accession to the EU and NATO. But today, even inside individual countries, there are very different views. Donald Tusk and Karol Nawrocki have different visions of Visegrad cooperation. Petr Pavel and Andrej Babiš have different views. In Hungary, the situation has also changed. In Slovakia, there is not such a major difference between Fico and Pellegrini, but overall, the region is highly diversified.

Babiš and Fico will certainly speak about the importance of Visegrad cooperation. Others will do the same. But in reality, this means very little. It is a weak factor.

Maintaining the Visegrad Group makes sense for the purpose for which it was created: regional cooperation. But not for European policy, and not for Atlantic policy.

‍“Fico may enjoy Zelenskyy’s problems, but he will not enter the Polish-Ukrainian dispute”

Let us move to Poland and the recent diplomatic scandal between Poland and Ukraine concerning the Order of the White Eagle. How does this affect Slovakia? Personally, I think that if there were any historical context that Fico could use to inflame tensions with Ukraine, he would do so. Fortunately, there is no such major historical tension between Ukraine and Slovakia. What is being said about this in Slovakia? 

Only journalists are writing about it. The broader public does not know much about it.

I think that even if there were some historical obstacles between Slovaks and Ukrainians, Fico would not enter into it. If Orbán were still in power and there were a historical issues that connected Fico and Orbán politically, then I could imagine Fico playing along with Orbán.

But Nawrocki and Fico are very different political worlds. Polish-Ukrainian relations are also too self-contained for Fico to enter into them in any meaningful way.

As you said, there are no such major problems in Slovak-Ukrainian relations that Fico could use to attack Ukraine. Even if there were some issues going back to 1945 or 1946, Fico would, in my opinion, be very cautious.

Why create additional problems? Fico now wants to present himself as a more moderate figure. I think he will stay away from this issue.

That said, Fico is certainly watching it. I think he is internally pleased. He hates Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Zelenskyy is a complete antipode to Fico.

Zelenskyy fights for freedom. He is a politician who stood up to Russia. He is popular at home, far more popular than Fico is in Slovakia, where Fico has around 20% support. Zelenskyy is also popular internationally. He is seen as a symbol of freedom and as a leader of the free world.

Fico cannot stand him. So personally, I think Fico is probably pleased that Nawrocki withdrew this honor from Zelenskyy. But Fico himself will not enter into it directly.

He may make a few statements at party meetings or party events. But this role is more likely to be played by Ľuboš Blaha, who will shout that Zelenskyy is a fascist and so on. There are a few others as well, such as Richard Glück. But Fico himself will not enter this dispute directly.

‍“Hlavné správy are not the cause of the problem; they are part of a wider ecosystem”

We now see disinformation spreading in Slovakia. Among the actors spreading it are Ľuboš Blaha and Hlavné správy, a large platform in an EU member state where one would expect a higher level of media literacy. Why do Slovaks believe this kind of disinformation? Why is there such a high level of trust in platforms like Hlavné správy or in figures like Ľuboš Blaha? 

I would not exaggerate the role of Hlavné správy. Yes, among disinformation outlets — and I do not consider them real media — they are significant. They are a propaganda tool.

At the same time, Hlavné správy do have some kind of editorial policy. There are names there, often under pseudonyms, and they try to create the impression that they are media. I would call them fifty percent media and fifty percent propaganda tool.

Among the many dozens of disinformation platforms in Slovakia, they are probably the most opinion-forming. But even their influence is limited to a few percent.

If you look at surveys of media credibility, the most trusted sources are television and radio: private Radio Expres, Slovak Radio, Slovak Television, then Markíza, JOJ, TA3, and Slovak print media. Mainstream outlets such as Pravda, Sme, Dennik N or even tabloids are more visible and trusted than Hlavné správy. Hlavné správy appear only marginally.

They are popular only within a certain part of society: among supporters of the current governing coalition, among radical voters, and similar groups.

So yes, Hlavné správy spread disinformation and are part of the trend. But they are not the main reason why a significant part of Slovaks are influenced by disinformation. The problem is wider. This ecosystem exists, and it spreads Russian narratives.

There are also direct Russian actors involved. The Russian embassy is very active in Slovakia. In fact, it is certainly the most active foreign embassy in this field. Surveys show that its interactions with its social media content are several times higher than interactions with the content of Western embassies.

But why do many Slovaks believe these disinformation narratives? There are structural reasons.

First, Slovakia is a highly conspiracy-minded country. A majority of Slovaks believe in various conspiracy theories. According to surveys, Slovakia ranks very high in this regard. Around 50 to 60 percent of people believe in different conspiracy theories: Jewish conspiracies, theories about 9/11, and many other systemic conspiracy narratives.

In such an environment, disinformation narratives of a conspiratorial type spread easily. The idea that hidden forces are behind everything fits into this worldview.

The second structural factor is pan-Slavism. In Slovakia, there is a folk and cultural pan-Slavic tradition. In practice, I would say this often takes the form of Russophilia. It is not exactly pan-Russism, but Russophilia rooted in pan-Slavic ideas.

When you combine conspiracy theories, pan-Slavism, and sympathy toward Russia as a country that supposedly “protects Slavs” or “helps Slavs,” you create another powerful layer. Of course, this idea does not correspond to reality. What kind of Slavic brotherhood is it when Russia, a Slavic country, is fighting against Ukraine? Ukraine often does not even appear in this pan-Slavic imagination.

Another factor is the complex of a small country and a small nation: a feeling of powerlessness, of always being an object of interest or pressure from larger nations, especially Western ones.

This also creates sympathy for authoritarianism and the rule of a strong hand. And where do people see this strong hand? In Russia. They see Putin as an “effective” ruler.

Distrust toward democratic institutions is another factor that helps the spread of conspiratorial and pro-Russian narratives.

All Slovak disinformation outlets are pro-Russian. All of them. Hlavné správy, Hlavný denník, Infovojna, Zem a vek, and many smaller platforms with tens of thousands of followers — all of them are pro-Russian.

When all these factors are put together, they create clusters that keep part of the population in pro-Russian attitudes. Of course, the numbers vary depending on the question. Sometimes it may be 10% to 15 %, sometimes 30%. Some analysts, such as Saša Duleba, speak of an anti-system sentiment of around 20%. Quantification is always delicate.

From public opinion surveys, we can track how people answer questions such as who is responsible for the war in Ukraine — Russia, the West, or Ukraine itself — and whether they want Ukraine or Russia to win.

In Slovakia, there are more supporters of Russia than in Czechia, Poland, or Hungary. In Poland, such people are marginal, only a few percent. In Czechia, society is traditionally more pro-Western, though there are Russophiles there too. In Hungary, I see the current situation more as a temporary result of Fidesz government policy.

Slovakia has more people who support some form of cooperation with Russia. But we should distinguish between groups. There are people who support EU membership but also believe that Slovakia can do good business with Russia and that Russia is a friendly country. That is, of course, a complete delusion.

Those who would want Slovakia to be fully and firmly in an alliance with Russia make up around 8% to 10%. Those who want business with Russia are more numerous, perhaps up to a quarter of the population. But many of them still want Slovakia to remain in the European Union.

So the hard radicals are certainly not a majority.

‍“For Slovak nationalists and Russophiles, Trump is their person”

Surveys also show that Slovaks have low trust in the United States and in Americans. A strong narrative has spread: the West is one thing, but the United States is different — capitalist, focused only on money, and so on. Then Trump came. Has the attitude of Slovaks toward Americans changed? Has the rhetoric around Trump changed? Is this felt in Slovakia? 

It is not felt that strongly. Who supports Trump? Trump is supported by Slovak nationalists and Russophiles.

In their perception, Trump is closer to their idea of a strong leader. He is seen as someone who is open to Russia and who, in essence, does not oppose Russia. 

I think people separate the United States from Trump. Some separate them in such a way that America remains unacceptable to them, but Trump is acceptable. This applies especially to more informed voters of the current governing coalition, as well as voters of Republika and nationalist circles.

For them, Trump is completely their person.

At the same time, anti-Americanism remains. The United States is still seen as a global power. These two ideas can exist in one person’s mind: Trump may be viewed positively, while the United States as a global actor remains viewed negatively.

This problem does not exist with Russia and Putin. There, Putin and Russia are seen as one and the same. Putin means Russia. For these people, both are good. With Trump, it is a little different.

On the pro-Western side, people remain pro-American despite being against Trump or critical of Trump.

When it comes to specific signals, for example, from the G7 or other summits, such things do not penetrate Slovak public opinion very quickly. They are complicated issues. They operate more on the level of signals.

For people who are anti-American but accept Trump, one important signal is that Trump negotiates with Putin. They say, " Look, he is negotiating with Putin, he wants to make a deal. He is not Biden, who called Putin a criminal”.

Another signal is how Trump treats Zelenskyy. He disqualifies Zelenskyy and shows antipathy toward him. That is an important signal for these audiences, and it has been present from the beginning of Trump’s presidency.

But what Trump says at a summit, or what he says about Iran and the United States, is not something the broader Slovak public follows closely. Slovakia is a small country. Of course, there are activists with strong views — media, political, civic activists — and in these circles the issue is highly polarized.

As for public opinion, this can be studied through surveys. GLOBSEC conducts annual polling and, as far as I know, also measures the popularity and trustworthiness of political leaders. They usually track figures such as Macron, Merz, Trump, and perhaps Putin across Central Europe and other countries in the region. This can be followed through their data.

One more point: anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism are not exactly the same thing, but they are strongly connected. A person who is anti-Western is very likely to be anti-American. But if that person also sees Trump as somehow different from the traditional United States, they may accept Trump.

‍“The main challenge is to preserve democracy and Slovakia’s Western orientation” 

What are the main challenges facing Slovakia now, perhaps in the next six months?

The internal challenge is to preserve democracy.

The rule of law in Slovakia has been dismantled. This is a separate issue, but the principle of selective justice now applies in Slovakia.

If you are part of the ruling grouping and you committed something in the past, this ruling grouping protects you by all possible means. They undermine investigations. They undermine court decisions. They amend legislation to reduce punishments.

So the challenge is to preserve the rule of law, preserve democracy, and preserve Slovakia’s Western orientation.

After Orbán disappeared from the political map in the form in which he existed before, this is a positive signal for Slovakia. Fico can no longer clearly promote the Russian line in the European Union. And the European Union would be able to deal with him much more easily now than if Orbán were still there.

This is not only a challenge for the next six months. It is a challenge for the next year, until the elections in October 2027.

There will also be regional or local elections in October. The challenge there will be for democratic forces to remain strong not only at the national level, but also in regions and municipalities.

But the two main challenges are clear: preserving democracy and preserving Slovakia’s pro-Western orientation.