Digest of news from Slovakia, Czechia, and Poland, June 1 - 7, 2026
Slovakia
1) Ukrainian and Slovak foreign ministers meet in Vinnytsia; intergovernmental consultations in the works
2) Slovak FM Blanar: the war must end in line with international law and without violating Ukraine's territorial integrity
Analysis:
On 5 June, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha and his Slovak counterpart Juraj Blanar held talks in Vinnytsia, following up on agreements reached between Presidents Zelenskyi and Prime Minister Fico in Yerevan back in May. Sybiha confirmed that the two sides are actively working on the date and venue for the next round of intergovernmental consultations, which Zelenskyi had previously indicated could take place in Kyiv or Bratislava before the end of June. Blanar also confirmed during the visit that Slovakia is prepared to support the opening of the first and other clusters of Ukraine's EU accession negotiations – a notable signal from a government that has otherwise maintained cautious distance from Kyiv's Euro-Atlantic trajectory.
At a joint press conference in Vinnytsia, Blanar stated that Slovakia has consistently held that the war has no military solution and must be resolved through diplomatic means. He expressed support for greater EU involvement in the peace process and made clear that Bratislava's goal is a sustainable settlement that respects international law and does not violate Ukraine's territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. He framed international law as Slovakia's primary security guarantee – a formulation that, while formally sound, sidesteps the harder questions of enforcement and timeline.
The Vinnytsia meeting marks a step toward operationalizing the Zelenskyi-Fico understanding from Yerevan and suggests that the diplomatic channel between Kyiv and Bratislava is being deliberately kept open. Blanar's visit and his public statements on territorial integrity represent the most substantively pro-Ukrainian language to come from a senior Slovak official in some time. How much of this reflects genuine policy convergence, and how much is diplomatic choreography ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara, remains to be seen. The Fico government's track record – from the Russian-funded Soviet cemetery ceremony in May to its habitual restraint on Russia-related criticism – makes any reading of continuity premature.
Czech Republic
1) PM Babiš: personal ties with Trump will protect Czech Republic from criticism over NATO defense spending shortfall
2) Babiš proposes Azerbaijani gas and oil transit through Ukraine; Zelenskyi signals openness
Analysis:
In an interview with The Financial Times published on 1st of June, Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš acknowledged that the Czech Republic will likely miss the NATO 2% GDP defense spending target in 2026. Rather than announcing corrective measures, Babiš pointed to his personal relationship with Donald Trump as a hedge against Alliance pressure, describing himself as a "Trumpist" who had met the US president five times. His remarks were made as European allies prepared for a tense encounter with Trump at the NATO summit in Ankara on 7–8 July. Separately, President Petr Pavel pushed back publicly, stating that personal friendships do not constitute a substitute for meeting Alliance commitments and that Prague would not be shielded from scrutiny. The episode reopened the ongoing institutional standoff between the two – Babiš and Pavel also remain at odds over who will represent the country at Ankara.
On 5 June, Babiš disclosed that during his May meeting with Zelenskyi in Yerevan, he raised the possibility of routing Azerbaijani gas and oil through Ukrainian territory. He stated that Zelenskyi responded positively to the idea. The disclosure came as Babiš spoke to Azerbaijani journalists on the sidelines of a visit to Montenegro, and fits within a broader Czech push to deepen energy ties with Baku: the Czech Minister of Industry had already announced in April that Prague aims to purchase two billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas annually, with deliveries potentially starting between 2028 and 2029. The transit arrangement, if formalized, would give Ukraine a new role in Central European energy logistics even as Russian gas is phased out under EU commitments.
These two news capture the contradictions of the Babiš government's foreign policy positioning. On defense, it is willing to accept the reputational and institutional costs of falling below Alliance targets while betting on informal access to the US administration. On energy, it is pursuing a pragmatic and potentially significant arrangement with Ukraine that aligns with EU diversification goals. These tracks are not necessarily incompatible, but they reflect a government that navigates multilateral commitments selectively – leveraging bilateral relationships where convenient and deferring obligations where politically inconvenient. For Ukraine, the energy transit signal is worth tracking; for European security architecture, the defense spending posture remains a liability.
Poland
1) European Commission takes Poland to the EU Court of Justice over failure to transpose aviation emissions directive
2) Ukraine-Poland dispute over history escalates: Budanov meets Polish Defense Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz over UPA unit naming controversy
Analysis:
On 4 June, the European Commission filed a lawsuit against Poland at the Court of Justice of the European Union for failing to transpose an updated EU directive on greenhouse gas emissions in the aviation sector. The directive, which progressively eliminates free emissions allowances for airlines under the EU Emissions Trading System and requires carriers to purchase permits at market auctions, had a transposition deadline of December 2023. Poland's draft legislation is still awaiting government approval, prompting Brussels to escalate to formal legal proceedings. If the court finds against Warsaw, Poland faces potentially significant financial penalties, including both lump-sum fines and daily charges for each day of continued non-compliance. A ruling is not expected before 2028. A similar case has been filed against Spain.
On 6 June, Head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office Kyrylo Budanov traveled to Warsaw for back-to-back meetings with Polish officials – first with Deputy Foreign Minister Marcin Bosacki on 5 June, then with Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. The formal trigger was Ukraine's decision to name a Special Operations Forces unit after the Heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a move that drew sharp protests from Warsaw given the UPA's association with the Volyn tragedy during World War II. Kosiniak-Kamysz stated publicly after meeting Budanov that Poland and Ukraine are security partners but that historical truth must be the basis of any shared future, adding that the memory of victims of the Voltn tragedy is non-negotiable. He had previously written to President Zelenskiy asking him to reverse the decision.
As IESS Senior Analyst Valerii Vins noted in a comment to the Polish outlet Onet, political disputes between Kyiv and Warsaw rooted in historical disagreement primarily serve Russian interests;. As Poland consistently remains one of the main targets of Russian information and psychological operations, and any escalation of historical tensions gives Moscow precisely the opening it seeks – to weaken both countries simultaneously and divert attention from the common threat. The domestic political dynamic in Poland compounds the risk, as historical politics has increasingly become an instrument of electoral competition, meaning that reactions to Ukrainian decisions are often shaped by internal electoral calculations instead of genuine historical sensitivities.