Digest of news from Slovakia, Czechia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland

September 14 – September 21, 2026

Joint Case: two presidents publicly rebuke Fico over Article 5

Czech President Petr Pavel took the unusual step of directly criticizing a fellow head of state's government, calling Robert Fico's statement that he doesn't want Slovakia dragged into a war "through some Article 5" an extraordinarily serious message that should never be treated as a model to follow. "Article 5 is an unambiguous expression of solidarity and mutual responsibility," Pavel said. 

"If someone says they're glad to be a NATO member, in other words that NATO protects them, but isn't ready to join in when someone else is attacked, they haven't understood the meaning of the word solidarity." He said he hoped Czechia would never go down that path.

Slovak President Peter Pellegrini made a nearly identical point about his own prime minister, telling Joj 24 that Slovakia cannot afford to signal it would sit out a conflict involving its allies. "We cannot send a signal that Slovakia would stay aside in case of conflict," Pellegrini said, noting that NATO membership carries obligations alongside its benefits. 

Two presidents from two different countries converging on the same rebuke, aimed at the same prime minister's remarks: Fico's Article 5 hedging is no longer just a domestic talking point, it is being treated by his own head of state and his closest neighbor's president as a genuine liability for Slovakia's alliance credibility.

Slovakia

1. Parliament approves sending troops to NATO's Eastern Sentry mission 

2. PM Fico says he won't let Slovakia be "dragged into war" via Article 5 

3. Fico accuses the West of "pouring oil on the fire" for four years in Ukraine 

Analysis:

Slovakia's National Council approved deploying around a hundred soldiers to Poland and Romania as part of NATO's Eastern Sentry operation, where they will help monitor airspace, contribute to early warning, and build a shared situational picture along the alliance's eastern flank using new 3D radar systems designed to track drones. Defense Minister Robert Kaliňák framed it as a chance to field-test Slovak equipment as much as a contribution to collective defense, saying the deployment would double as "real experience working with the new capabilities we have."

Days later, Fico said he does not want Slovakia pulled into a military conflict "through some Article 5," insisting that while Slovakia values its NATO membership and its obligations, he will do everything as prime minister to keep the country out of any war, pointing to Slovakia's low unemployment and growing infrastructure as things a conflict would put at risk. He confirmed he would still travel to Ukraine on September 18 for the Carpathian Initiative summit aimed at deepening regional cooperation among eight countries stretching from Ukraine to Austria and Serbia, a trip that sits awkwardly next to his own government's refusal to send Slovak military aid to Kyiv.

Fico went considerably further in a video address days after that, accusing the West of "pouring oil on the fire" in Ukraine for four years and arguing that Western politicians, frustrated by the failure of a strategy to defeat Russia through Ukrainian arms, may now be trying to provoke a direct NATO-Russia war instead. He conceded Russia started the war but argued it cannot be defeated conventionally, "only with nuclear weapons," and insisted that whoever wants to provoke a NATO-Russia conflict should bear responsibility for it rather than dragging in other alliance members. 

He also repeated a claim, which he attributed to Polish PM Donald Tusk, that 27,000 Ukrainian soldiers die at the front every month, adding that he had no grounds to question the figure even while suggesting it might be inflated to justify more Western aid.

A parliament voting to send troops to guard NATO's own frontier and the PM publicly floating the idea that the West, not Russia, bears responsibility for any future escalation are not really contradictory positions in Fico's Slovakia. Therefore, they are the same strategy that is seen in two different ways: participate just enough to remain a credible ally on paper, while using every other platform available to make the case that Slovakia's actual commitment should stop well short of that.

Czech Republic

1. PM Babiš urges regional coalitions to defend EU funds and hits out at Green Deal and Ukraine policy

2. Foreign Minister Macinka rejects Russian denials over Leipzig and imposes diplomatic curbs

Analysis:

At the Bled Strategic Forum in Slovenia, Prime Minister Andrej Babiš positioned himself as a champion of Central European interests against Brussels, calling on regional counterparts (including Slovenia’s Janez Janša, Croatia’s Andrej Plenković, and Hungary’s Péter Magyar) to forge coalitions dedicated to protecting cohesion funds and industrial competitiveness during negotiations on the EU’s 2028–2034 budget. Declaring the Visegrad Group to be "the future of Europe" after years of decline, Babiš argued that member states cannot accept funding cuts from the European Commission and predicted that upcoming elections in Poland, France, Spain, and Italy, along with the 2029 European vote, would redefine the continent's direction. 

He paired this budgetary defense with sharp attacks on European policies, targeting the Green Dealб which he previously endorsed in 2019, by claiming it cost Czech industry €6.5 billion, while also criticizing the EU’s handling of the war in Ukraine, claiming Brussels avoids pursuing peace and lacks consensus on whether to halt the conflict.

That populist posturing stood in stark contrast to the resolute stance maintained by the Czech diplomatic establishment. Foreign Minister Petr Macinka summoned Russian Ambassador Anna Ponomaryova to unequivocally reject Moscow’s claims that accusations surrounding recent hybrid sabotage – specifically the incident at Leipzig airport – were anti-Russian provocations. Citing compelling evidence from German authorities and investigations by two Czech intelligence agencies, Macinka condemned Russian subversion across the EU and informed the ambassador that Prague will introduce reciprocal restrictions on Russian diplomatic and technical personnel to match Moscow’s recent constraints on the Czech mission.

The episode captures a defining tension in Czech governance: while Babiš uses international platforms to revive Visegrad solidarity, challenge EU climate and budget targets, and question Western consensus on Ukraine, Prague’s foreign and security apparatus continues to systematically push back against Russian hybrid aggression and dismantle Moscow’s diplomatic footprint.

Hungary

1. PM Magyar confirms Hungary skipped Ukraine's "Carpathian Eight" format 

2. Budapest says it can fully replace Russian gas within a year 

3. Magyar blocks Ukrainian oil storage on Hungarian soil 

Analysis:

Prime Minister Péter Magyar told parliament that Hungary was invited to join the "Carpathian Eight," a Ukraine-led format meant to deepen cooperation among Carpathian region states, and turned it down "for good reasons" he declined to specify, adding simply that Hungary "doesn't participate in this."

That reticence sat oddly beside a genuine break with the Orbán era on energy: Energy Minister István Kapitány told Bloomberg that Hungary has enough pipeline capacity to secure gas from alternative sources at competitive prices well ahead of the EU's October 2027 deadline for ending Russian gas imports, a marked departure from sixteen years of Orbán-era policy that deepened Hungary's energy dependence on Moscow even as the rest of the EU worked to escape it. Budapest is also pursuing reduced electricity imports, expanded storage capacity, and new investment in wind power, aiming to shed a dependency that has long left the forint exposed to global oil and gas price swings.

Where Ukraine itself is concerned, though, Magyar drew a hard line. After Naftogaz announced a memorandum with Hungarian energy company MOL to explore building Ukrainian oil storage capacity near the Hungarian border, shielded from Russian strikes, Magyar told parliament flatly that no such facility would be built "as long as the Tisza government is in power." He said MOL had opened these talks with Naftogaz back under Orbán without the current government's knowledge or consent, a framing KDNP faction leader Bence Rétvári used to needle Magyar for learning about the plan from Ukrainian media, while also warning that hosting Ukraine's oil reserves would import a Russian targeting risk directly into Hungary's own eastern regions.

So Hungary is willing to stay bipolar in its international policy: Budapest is capable of walking away from Russian energy on its own initiative, but unwilling to extend Ukraine even a storage tank's worth of solidarity if it means absorbing risk Kyiv would rather not carry itself.

Romania

1. President Dan makes another attempt to end Romania's government crisis 

2. Dan proposes minority rights as a priority for the Carpathian Initiative  

Analysis:

President Nicușor Dan resumed consultations with parliamentary parties in search of a governing majority that would avoid early elections, the latest attempt to resolve a political crisis running since late spring, when the Social Democrats quit the coalition and backed a no-confidence vote against Ilie Bolojan's government. "We can't wait any longer," Dan said, signaling a prime ministerial nomination was imminent. Social Democrat leader Sorin Grindeanu said he was ready to take on the job, while AUR leader George Simion insisted his party would keep refusing to back any government that doesn't include it, and PNL signaled openness to negotiating with whoever gets nominated.

Separately, Dan used the Carpathian Eight summit to propose that protecting national minorities' linguistic and cultural rights become a priority of the broader Carpathian Initiative, noting that half the Carpathian range sits on Romanian territory and that the format could double as an extra channel of European integration for EU candidate countries in the region.

A president trying to assemble a functioning government at home and pitch a regional minority-rights framework abroad in the same week is a reminder that Romania's rising profile isn't only about drones and front-line proximity; Bucharest is also trying, however awkwardly, to position itself as a diplomatic convener for its neighborhood.

Poland

1. PM Tusk says intelligence points to Russian plans for "hybrid strikes" disguised as accidents 

2. Poland joins the European anti-ballistic missile coalition  

Analysis:

Marking the 87th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland, Tusk said Polish intelligence assessments point to Russian plans for hybrid strikes using drones and missiles against countries supporting Ukraine, Poland foremost among them, describing the latest intelligence as "very consistent and convincing." He said Russia would likely present any resulting incident as accidental specifically to avoid triggering a NATO response: "There's a real risk that drones or other projectiles could be launched onto the territory of one or several NATO countries on the eastern flank and even cause damage, with the official version being that it's an accident nobody has grounds to expect any NATO reaction to." The goal, Tusk argued, is to convince alliance members that Article 5 is theoretical rather than practical, on the assumption that no one wants to risk dying for Latvia or Lithuania over what looks like an isolated incident rather than a declared war. 

That assessment lines up closely with this Institute's own reporting this year on Russia's pattern of ambiguous, deniable provocations along NATO's frontier, from the cruise missile that crossed into Poland to the drone incident on the Bulgarian-Romanian border.

Separately, Tusk announced that Poland has formally joined the European "anti-ballistic coalition," a joint Ukrainian-European effort to strengthen defenses against ballistic missiles, revealing the move during the Carpathian Initiative summit after discussing the format with President Zelenskyy. "Remember the debates about whether Poland should be in the anti-ballistic coalition? Well, Poland is part of this big project as of today," Tusk said.

Poland understood that Russia is preparing with a concrete step toward the hardware meant to stop one: a rare instance this year of a government's rhetoric about the threat and its investment in countering it actually moving in the same direction at the same time.