Digest of news from Slovakia, Czechia, and Poland, April 27 - May 3, 2026
Slovakia
Key news to follow:
1. Slovakia drops its veto on the 20th EU sanctions package following the resumption of Druzhba pipeline transit
2. Kremlin confirms Fico will attend the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow
3. Fico speaks with Zelenskiy, signals diplomatic reset while affirming Ukraine's right to determine any peace settlement
Analysis:
On 23 April, Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár instructed Slovakia's permanent representative in Brussels to stop blocking the written approval procedure for the 20th EU sanctions package against Russia. The direct trigger was the confirmed resumption of Russian oil deliveries via the Druzhba pipeline, which Bratislava had made a precondition for its cooperation on both the sanctions package and the €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine. Blanár framed the decision as the fruit of sustained Slovak diplomatic pressure on Kyiv and the European Commission, a presentation that drew a prompt welcome from President Zelenskiy, who called for all commitments to be honoured without delay.
On 29 April, Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov publicly confirmed that Fico would attend the Victory Day parade in Moscow on 9 May as a foreign guest. The confirmation contradicted earlier reporting that the Slovak prime minister had opted out of the parade itself while keeping the overall Moscow visit intact. The logistical problem surrounding the trip remains: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania continue to deny passage to the Slovak government aircraft, meaning Fico will need to chart an alternative route, as he did in 2025, when he travelled via Hungary, Romania, the Black Sea, and Georgia.
On 2 May, Fico and Zelenskiy held a telephone conversation ahead of their brief encounter at the European Political Community summit in Yerevan. Fico posted a summary on Facebook in which he confirmed Slovakia's support for Ukraine's EU accession, stated that no peace agreement was achievable without Ukraine's consent, and outlined plans for future bilateral governmental meetings and capital visits. The tone represented a marked shift from earlier in the year, when Fico had threatened to block accelerated EU accession procedures for Ukraine for as long as the Druzhba suspension lasted.
Slovakia's week traced a distinct arc. The resumption of Druzhba transit unlocked a series of downstream changes: the sanctions veto was dropped, accession support was restored, and bilateral diplomacy moved toward normalization. Fico's language softened in step with the leverage he had already spent. The Moscow visit remains the one element that has not bent to European pressure, which suggests it serves a different domestic political function from the energy and sanctions dossiers – one that Bratislava does not expect to trade away.
Czech Republic
Key news to follow:
1. Czech Republic becomes the 23rd country to join the agreement on the Special Tribunal for Russian aggression
2. Prague grants overflight permission for Fico's Moscow trip, rebutting Russian disinformation claims
Analysis:
On 28 April, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha announced that the Czech Republic had declared its intention to join the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Special Tribunal for the crime of Russian aggression against Ukraine, making it the 23rd country to do so. The tribunal agreement is scheduled for a vote at the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 14-15 May in Chisinau. Prague's step came the week after a similar announcement by Greece and follows signals from Council of Europe Secretary-General Alain Berset that significant accountability developments were approaching.
On 2 May, the Czech Foreign Ministry publicly corrected claims published by the Russian newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets, which had asserted that Prague had refused Fico's aircraft permission to cross Czech airspace on its way to Moscow. Spokesperson Adam Chorgo confirmed that Slovakia's standard overflight request had been received and approved without delay. The denial set Prague apart from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, all of which declined the overflight request on political grounds.
The two developments place Czech foreign policy in two separate registers that are nonetheless compatible. Joining the Special Tribunal agreement aligns Prague with the coalition of states pressing for legal accountability for Russia's aggression, a position the country has maintained consistently. Approval of Fico's overflight was handled as a procedural rather than a political matter. The combination illustrates a Czech approach that keeps its substantive positions clear while avoiding symbolic confrontations where they are not judged necessary.
Poland
Key news to follow:
1. A comprehensive report documents Russia's systematic hybrid campaign against Poland, including the deliberate use of Ukrainian nationals as instruments of destabilization
2. Warsaw negotiates to retain and expand the US military presence as Trump announces further troop withdrawals from Germany
Analysis:
On 1 May, a detailed analysis of a Defense24 report catalogued more than six years of documented Russian hybrid operations against Poland. The report identifies Poland as a testing ground where Russian and Belarusian intelligence services probe the limits of NATO's collective resolve through a combination of cyberattacks, arson, railway sabotage, GPS disruption, and the systematic recruitment of financially motivated agents. Ukrainian nationals account for 38 percent of those detained in connection with hybrid incidents, a figure the report attributes to a deliberate Russian strategy of using the Ukrainian diaspora to damage relations between Kyiv and Warsaw. The authors note that 95 percent of recruited agents acted for financial rather than ideological reasons, and project a further increase in hybrid activity throughout 2026.
On 3 May, Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz confirmed that Poland was in active negotiations with Washington over preserving and expanding the American military contingent on Polish territory. His statement followed President Trump's announcement of a planned withdrawal of around 5,000 troops from Germany, with indications that a larger reduction was under consideration. Kosiniak-Kamysz was direct: Poland wants US forces to remain in Europe and specifically in Poland, and the country's strategic course would not change regardless of what happens in Germany. US congressional leaders had already called for redeploying withdrawn troops to NATO's eastern flank, lending some institutional support to Warsaw's position.
The hybrid war report documents the scale and sophistication of the campaign Russia is already conducting on Polish soil, with its deliberate exploitation of the Ukrainian community adding a specific bilateral dimension. The negotiations over US troop levels address the conventional deterrence layer that sits above the hybrid contest. Both tracks reflect the same underlying Polish assessment: the threat is real, it is growing, and the country's security architecture needs to be reinforced on multiple fronts simultaneously.